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Before 1914, London, the financial centre of a country half the USA’s size, had a stock 
exchange that was larger and qualitatively more developed than New York for both 
domestic and overseas financing needs. J. P. Morgan’s higher profits in New York arose 
partly from conflicted deals that would later be illegal, as they already were in London. 
His contributions to the rapid catch-up process by New York are more plausibly seen in 
terms of successful emulation of European precedents than the information signalling 








“Currency, banking and finance have always been the stumbling blocks of American 
industry. Again and again they have brought it to utter grief. If the Americans had 
natural aptitude for finance they would have given themselves long ago a sound 
currency and banking system…. The Wall Street oligarchy has no counterpart in 
Europe and its existence here is inconceivable…. The American…. gorgeous style of 
capitalisation may not serve him so well on this side of the Atlantic as it has done on his 
own.” 
             L a w s o n ,   American Industrial Problems, London, 1903, pp. 23, 222, 392. 
 
 
“The investment business is not yet with us as well developed or as well understood as it 
is in England.” 
             L y o n ,   Capitalization, Boston, 1913, p. 207.   
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                    In the decades before the First World War, Britain dominated the world 
financial system and its richer citizens were prolific owners of stock exchange securities 
both at home and abroad. The contemporary French financial analyst, Alfred Neymarck, 
estimated that in 1910 nearly ₤6 billions of tradable securities– a quarter of the global 
total - were owned by Britons: that is, in per capita terms, more than three times the 
level in the USA and Germany.1  At the turn of the century, London had more banks 
than any other city in the world, more than a third of them foreign banks and British 
banks operating primarily overseas, and nearly half of the global stock of multinational 
investment in 1914 originated in the UK.2  Of the major international corporate 
borrowers, only Russians favoured Paris and Brussels over London. London perhaps 
had an unfair advantage in attracting listings of Indian, Australian and Canadian 
companies, but enterprises operating in the Netherlands, the Transvaal, Japan, Mexico, 
the USA and Argentina also preferred London for their international borrowing. This 
leading global position was bolstered by an unparalleled network of banking 
correspondent relationships and by an impressively large and forward-looking British 
commercial diaspora. In a market promising new opportunities, like Japan, there were 
more resident UK nationals and British-owned firms than the totals from the USA and 
Germany combined.3  If any city can be said to link global entrepreneurial communities 
in 1900, it was cosmopolitan London, and, in so far as it had a rival, that was Paris. 
 
          London’s  continuing  lead  over New York – the commercial and financial 
capital of a country with twice the UK’s GDP - is particularly striking. In 1902, at the 
end of a major flotation and merger wave that greatly increased industrial listings, the 
value of all securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was still less 
                                                  
1 Neymarck, Statistique international, p. 23. This is lower than later estimates of Britain’s 
overseas and domestic capital stock, but, of course, much of that was not in tradable 
securities. 
2 Whitaker, Almanack, pp. 291-296, 310-320; Dunning, Explaining, p. 73. 
3 Sugiyama, Japan’s industrialization, p. 41 for 1895 ; Anon, Japan year book, p. 21 for 
1905.   4
than a third of London’s.4  It was still not much more than half as late as 1917.5 If  the 
comparison is confined to domestic equities, in which the London market has 
traditionally been portrayed as lacklustre, the London market’s total value was still in 
1900 at least 50% larger than New York in absolute terms. This implies that, in relation 
to the size of its host economy, London started the century with three times New York’s 
domestic metropolitan equity capacity.6 For  international securities, there was simply 
no contest: New York’s role was negligible, not only compared with London, but with 
Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam or Berlin. Hundreds of American and German companies 
paid to list in London, but only a few British companies paid to list in Berlin and none 
until well after the turn of the century in New York.7    In 1900, investors in London 
could buy shares not only in American railroads (which had long been a staple) but in 
Chicago meatpacking, Milwaukee breweries, America’s largest flour miller and Kodak 
cameras, none of these being available on the NYSE. America’s largest business 
corporation of the nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania Railroad, had been paying to 
list in London (as well as on its native Philadelphia exchange and on Paris) for decades 
when, as late as December 1900, it reluctantly agreed to a formal listing on the NYSE. 
In 1901 well over four thousand British and foreign companies were listed in London’s 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, but just over 200 corporations had stocks traded 
on the NYSE.8  As late as 1912, London listed the securities of 71 of the world’s largest 
100 enterprises by equity capitalization (30 US-headquartered, 28 
British-headquartered and 13 headquartered elsewhere), while the NYSE dealt in only 
                                                  
4 Pratt, The work, pp. 81-2; Stock Exchange Daily Official Intelligence 1902, p.1098. This 
comparison is at nominal (par) values. In view of the greater prevalence of stock watering in 
New York, the discrepancy at market values was likely greater. 
5 Martin,  New York, p. 179; Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1918, p. 1682. 
6 Dimson et al., Triumph, p. 23. These figures are arguably an underestimate of London’s 
domestic equity lead, since they exclude the Bank of England (then investor-owned and with 
no New York equivalent), all except the largest equity classes in any company where there 
were two or more classes of ordinary/deferred (multiple cases in London; unknown in New 
York) and the unlisted/supplementary lists (possibly larger in London than New York). 
7 As is clear from the listings in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, Saling’s 
Bőrsenjahrbuch and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 
8  Fisher, “President’s Address,” p. 1109 for the UK; Commercial and Financial Chronicle for 
1901 (NYSE railroads and “miscellaneous” stocks).     5
40 of them (all but the Canadian Pacific US-headquartered).9  New York was probably 
then near London’s scale for domestic issues, but it was many decades before it achieved 
international listings at the level London had earlier attained. 
              T h e r e   a r e   m u l t i p l e   b o o k s and articles on London as a financial centre, 
but this literature contains surprisingly few explicit discussions of the sources of this 
remarkable and sustained competitive success.10  Lance Davis’s classic comparative 
article emphasized the incapacity of US markets to keep up with the enormous financial 
mobilization demands of the rapidly growing US economy and the consequently greater 
reliance on plutocratic, concentrated ownership structures there, findings later 
reinforced by Rubinstein’s analysis of the relative scale of US and UK business 
fortunes.11  Much recent analysis of barriers to financial development has focused on 
information asymmetries. Sylla and Smith diagnosed an initial British lead in provision 
of information to investors and Hannah supports this perspective, suggesting that 
accounting historians may have underestimated the scope and quality of UK auditing.12 
Market structure and business conduct may also have played a role: Michie showed that, 
until just before the First World War, the London Stock Exchange retained a 
remarkably flexible and competitive structure which encouraged firms to seek a public 
quotation, whereas New York was hampered by monopolistic restrictions.13 Broadberry 
has recently underlined the exceptionally large share of UK resources devoted to 
finance and Britain’s initial productivity lead in these services.14  
               More  generally,  it  is  plausible  that  London  retained  a  first  mover 
advantage in this sector, long after its output had been overtaken by larger, follower 
countries in commodity businesses such as steel or coal, with lower barriers to entry. 
Because it provided the world’s largest pool of liquidity, London attracted skilled 
financiers from around the world, reinforcing local knowledge spillovers and external 
economies of scale. In the absence of major disequilibrium of the kind that enveloped 
                                                  
9 Author’s calculation from Wardley’s global list (“Top 100”) and listing details in Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence and Commercial and Financial Chronicle Bank and 
Quotation Section. 
10  For a sample, see Michie, ed., Development. 
11  Davis, “The capital markets;” Rubinstein, ed., Wealth. 
12   Sylla and Smith, “Information;” Hannah, “The ‘Hollywood History’ of Corporate 
Governance.” 
13 Michie.  London and New York, pp. 274-6. 
14  Broadberry, “Forging ahead,” pp. 7, 11.   6
Europe from 1914, this made its initial lead relatively impregnable and self-reinforcing. 
Other countries could quickly emulate London innovations or even invent new financial 
techniques before London (as Paris and Amsterdam had long shown), but the scale 
economies and concentrated financial skills of London at the end of the nineteenth 
century were difficult to match. The effects were similar to the dominant role of sterling 
in international trade and merchants’ preference for the bill on London to settle trade 
accounts: financial accommodation was convenient and cheap in the world’s most liquid 
market. The main global liquidity pools for trade finance and stock exchange finance 
were mutually reinforcing, through the operations of the London money market.15 
               Y e t   t h e r e   i s   a   v o l u m i n o us tradition of complaint – emanating more from 
armchair critics rather than the businessmen, financiers and investors who used these 
facilities - that other countries’ stock markets were qualitatively superior and that 
London’s performance in this sector burdened the home economy. The whole British 
“declinist” literature has this undercurrent: British merchant banks favoured 
international business at the expense of domestic firms; gentlemanly capitalists 
pursued imperial satisficing at the expense of profitable domestic technological 
innovation; mergers between old enterprises were financed, while small and vigorous 
firms were locked out.16  Kennedy suggested that the British financial markets were 
particularly inept at shifting resources to new industries like electricity and 
automobiles.17  De Long argued that competitive banking was a grave disadvantage to 
London because it inhibited the emergence of a quality certifying oligopoly that 
privileged the NYSE’s development.18  Chandler asserted that early twentieth century 
British capitalists were damagingly bent on preserving personal ownership, while 
American plutocrats and their families were more inclined to accept the divorce of 
ownership from professional management control.19  It is a measure of the intuitive 
appeal of “declinist” perspectives in the British narrative (and of the converse “Whig” or 
functionalist modernisation perspectives in American history) that clear contrary 
                                                  
15 Michie,  London and New York, pp. 132-64. 
16   For a summary and critique of this literature, see Clarke and Trebilcock, eds., 
Understanding decline. 
17 Kennedy,  Industrial structure. 
18  De Long, “Did J. P. Morgan’s Men.” 
19Chandler, Scale and Scope.   7
evidence – in fact, British firms already in 1900 had more substantially divorced 
ownership from control - could simply be ignored20  
           O n e   b a n k e r   w i t h   a n   u n u s u a lly favourable vantage point from which to 
reflect on London and New York at the turn of the century was the colossus of Wall 
Street, John Pierpont Morgan. The Morgan partnership at 22 Old Broad Street, London 
was originally the main business of Pierpont’s father, and for two decades after his 
death was still known as J S Morgan & Co.21  Morgans in London had been second only 
to Barings in floating US railroad issues in the classic period of overseas financing of US 
corporations. Morgans began the 1890s with as large a position in Old Broad Street as 
in 23 Wall Street and many of its US clients were “inheritances” from the London 
partnership.22  Pierpont, in the 1890s, decisively shifted the balance of his family 
businesses to New York, seeing himself as the bearer of the sound London practices of 
an ethical conservative banker, worthy of public credit, to a new venue where they were 
badly needed.23  He referred to his New York firm as “merchant bankers” in the English 
fashion, rather than using the new-fangled American “investment banker.”24 French 
and German corporate banks had extensive London operations but their American 
equivalents had none before 1919 (being barred by their government from operating 
abroad), giving private partnerships like Morgan’s a striking competitive advantage in 
linking New York with the world’s financial heartland. Morgan still worked and played 
in London, where he owned two houses, for around three months every spring. His son 
(and successor in 1913), the even more Anglophile “Jack” Morgan, served his 
apprenticeship as a partner in London for eight years beginning in 1898. Both Morgans 
routinely cooperated with British capitalists, for whom their firms had long been a 
conduit to American wealth-building opportunities: Sir Charles Tennant, for example, 
was one of the three voting trustees of the Erie Railroad, along with Pierpont. When 
Pierpont successfully thwarted Harriman’s bid for the Northern Pacific Railroad in 
1901, it was by virtue of Jack’s purchases of the pivotal final shares in London.25 
                                                  
20Hannah, “Divorce;” see also Colli, History, pp. 85-97; Becht and De Long, “Why has there 
been so little blockholding.” On the Whig fallacy in American business history more 
generally, see Lamoreaux et al., “Against Whig History.”   
21 Carosso,  The Morgans, pp. 273, 276. 
22  Ibid, pp. 12, 77-8, 224, 249, 290, 354, 390. . 
23  Ibid, p. 294; see also pp. 352, 647. 
24  Roberts, “What’s in a Name?” p. 34. 
25 Carosso,  The Morgans, pp. 373,376,477.   8
              
                      Yet the financial results of Morgan’s twin operations appear strikingly 
different. In the period 1900-1913 the New York partnership averaged net profits (after 
interest) of $5.9 million a year, while the British house only averaged $0.3 million 
annually between 1900 and 1909.26  These figures need to be related to the human and 
capital resources employed. There were in the early twentieth century about 150 
employed by Morgan in New York, in addition to partners and associates, and a further 
75 at Drexel & Co in Philadelphia, all generating the reported American partnership 
profits, while the London house employed under 50.27  This is compatible with profits 
per employee more than four times higher on the American side. Returns to capital are 
more difficult to compare. The average capital in the London partnership accounts for 
1900-1909 was $8.7 million, a figure very similar to Pierpont’s father’s core London 
operation of the 1880s; and this implies an average net, post-interest return in the first 
decade of the century of only 3.5%. This was about what a conservative, gentlemanly, 
English banker, leveraging his father’s reputation, could, with an above average share 
of luck, earn, but – American citizenship apart – that is a not wholly inaccurate 
description of Morgan. The reported figure for J. P. Morgan’s partnership interest when 
he died in 1913 implies a total capital in the US partnership that had then risen to 
$75.9 million, a sharp increase from the 1895 figure at only $7.1-7.3 million.28 The 
American balance sheets are not available annually, but, assuming constant annual 
growth in partnership capital, the rate of profit (in addition to normal interest) on the 
American partners’ capital would have averaged 13.5% between 1900 and 1913.29 
 
                                         I I  
 
         Why, then, were Morgan partners so much more handsomely rewarded in 
New York? In order to answer that question we have to look at their main source of fees: 
business corporations. Carosso’s history of the firm identifies two kinds of high fee 
                                                  
26  Ibid, pp. 615-16; Burk, Morgan Grenfell, p. 265. 
27 Carosso,  The Morgans, pp. 436, 459. 
28  Ibid, pp. 273, 276, 644, 745 n. 124. 
29 These figures may seem surprisingly modest considering the alleged price gouging of the 
“money trust.” However, these figures for “net profit” exclude interest paid to the partners, 
so are a measure of economic rent (monopoly profit in excess of normal capital charges) 
rather than total profit on capital.   9
transactions: railroad reorganisations (especially in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century) and industrial mergers (especially in the first decade of the twentieth). 
Railroads provoked lively contemporary debate on the “Europe versus America” 
question and the transatlantic differences were striking. European railroads were run 
by the state, as in Germany or Belgium, or, where private, as in France and Britain, by 
stable, professional boards of directors (typically business users, managers and 
bankers) and the railway professionals that they appointed. As Colleen Dunlavy has 
emphasised, this was partly underpinned by “democratic” or “prudent mean” voting 
rules (one-shareholder one-vote, or reduced voting power with cumulative blocks of 
shares), which prevented plutocratic shareholders exercising control over European 
railways.30 In the United States, by contrast, “plutocratic” (i.e the, now normal, 
one-share  one-vote) voting was the corporate norm, there was an active market in 
corporate control, and (apart from a few roads such as the Pennsylvania, with 
European-style professional management and widespread share-ownership) personal 
ownership of US railroads by plutocrats with a large, sometimes majority, stockholding 
was common.31 That control could, however, be precarious, both because others could 
acquire stock - in the market or from other large holders - to challenge minority control 
and because American railroads were more heavily leveraged by bonds (and by 
fixed-interest preferred stocks) than their European equivalents, laying them open to 
foreclosure by bondholders if payments were missed. This unusually high leverage was 
partly because their early European investors had wanted to limit the managerial 
discretion of distant corporations, partly because the equity culture in America was 
then underdeveloped, while bonds were well understood by NYSE investors and 
dominated the market. As in the United States, large European railroad corporations 
were the core of the quoted corporate economy in the 1890s, but they had a higher 
proportion of equity capital and they hardly ever (and, in the case of major lines, never) 
went bankrupt. In the USA, in the 1893 crisis, nearly a quarter of all railroad mileage – 
at a time when railroads completely dominated the NYSE stock and bond list - was in 
receivership. To European observers, one distinctive characteristic of American 
financial capitalism was that it was bankrupt. 
          Morgan saw more clearly than anyone how to remedy this, because he 
understood the weaknesses of American finance and governance. 32 His railroad 
                                                  
30  Dunlavy, “Corporate Governance.” 
31 Hannah,  “Divorce.” 
32 Carosso,  Morgans, pp. 363-70; Tufano, “Business Failure.”   10
reorganisations have two hallmarks, both tending to propel America closer to European 
norms. The first was the voting trust. If any large stockholder or director– like William 
P. Clyde in the Southern reorganisation – refused to put controlling shares in a trust, 
Morgan simply walked away (seven months later Clyde came begging and Morgan 
resumed work). He wanted to install professional railway managers on whom he could 
rely to use new money to reorganise the road technically and commercially and he 
wanted to prevent marauding plutocrats gaining control and sabotaging that work for 
short-term gain.33 The voting trust, typically for five years initially, but often renewed 
for longer, essentially gave that stability, by taking the voting rights away from 
stockholders and putting them in the hands of Morgan’s men and their fellow voting 
trustees. Both Morgan and his partner, Henry Davison, explicitly stated that they saw 
this as the equivalent of the European norm of what Dunlavy calls “democratic” 
voting. 34   However, as in Europe, its principal effect was to ensure incumbent 
(Morgan-appointed) board control, even when the board did not personally own a 
majority of a road’s stock.   
         At the same time, Morgan’s men undertook a thorough review of the 
revenue-earning power of the railroad and of its needs for new investment funds to 
improve that earning power, usually resulting in the second hallmark of the Morgan 
method: that the proportion of bond capital had to be reduced, while that of equity was 
increased. Again lowering excessive leverage ratios was standard British practice; 
indeed the pattern was set by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, reconstructed in 1892 
by the London office. Moving more US roads in that direction required full-time 
attention (New York partner and railroad specialist, Charles Coster, gave it) as well as 
some fine judgments among local contending interests. Often, stockholders were forced, 
by the threat of foreclosure, to put in more equity, via direct assessments or heavily 
discounted issues. Preferred stock was also widely issued, with British-style restraints 
on senior debt issues to enhance the appeal of such stocks.35 In some reconstructions, 
like the Erie and Southern, it was difficult to make a settlement that gave a realistic 
chance of raising future capital by stock rather than bonds and leverage remained high. 
                                                  
33 One can, of course, debate whether a fluid market in corporate control is better than 
entrenching stable management teams in self-perpetuating corporate boards. That was not, 
however, a debate that Morgan – or European railway directors – cared to have: they were 
closet Chandlerians on this issue. 
34 Pujo,  Hearings, pp.1058-60, 1970-72. 
35  Tufano, “Business failure,” pp. 22-3.   11
Yet, the confidence in Morgan’s men’s ability to get this difficult balance right, 
guaranteeing a return to preferred stockholders and – if things went well - perhaps 
eventually to common stockholders also, was the key to successful re-financing. That 
they – and others with similar skills - generally got this right is shown by the dramatic 
improvement in railroad finances in the decades before World War One. In 1901-10, the 
overall return on railroad common stocks was 121%, substantially influenced not by the 
modest dividends, but by capital gains, as confidence they would not again be worthless 
improved. This was slightly better than the return on industrials and well above the 
21% on other utilities.36 In the crisis of 1907-08, less than 5 % of US railroads were in 
receivership, a dramatic improvement on the 1890s, though still the Wild West to 
Europeans.37 
             O f  c o u r s e ,  s t a b l e  a n d  w e ll-run US railroads, like the Pennsylvania or the 
New York Central, had no need of de-leveraging or corporate restructuring and the 
ordinary issue business that the firm conducted for such roads was, accordingly, not 
especially remunerative.38  However, elsewhere the reorganisation skills of Morgan and 
his team of railroad company doctors were at a premium: it is here that the largest 
profits of the partnership were made in the 1890s. For example, the Reading deal of 
1895-1897 netted them $3.4 million in reorganisation and underwriting fees.39 They 
earned such fees because they were the best in the business. They could not earn such 
fees in Europe because the financial and management problems addressed generally did 
not exist there. This was also why, by the turn of the century, Morgan’s market share 
was higher in New York than in London. 
 
 
                                          III 
           T h e  r a i l r o a d s  w e r e  a l r e a d y publicly quoted firms, but Morgan’s major 
industrial initiatives often involved the flotation of firms that were previously owned by 
entrepreneurs or their descendants. Even in the case of US Steel, where most of the 
initial assets except Carnegie Steel had been previously quoted, it was only a few years 
since Morgan or others had first sponsored their IPOs. This was a relatively new 
business everywhere, but newer in New York than on the main European bourses. It 
                                                  
36 Cowles,  Common-Stock Indexes, p. 48. 
37  Ramirez, “Did J. P. Morgan’s Men,” p. 675. 
38 Carosso,  Morgans, pp. 358-61.   
39  Ibid., pp. 382-83.   12
offered rich pickings, since the gap between the profits made by 
entrepreneurially-owned firms and the expectations of dividend returns of the investing 
public were so large. The price-earnings ratio for NYSE industrial stocks in the first 
decade of the twentieth century averaged 13 (and the dividend yield was even more 
generous), while private sales of businesses to new principals achieved less than half 
that.40  In an IPO, if the decline in profitability from reducing the incentives of personal 
ownership could be neutralised or limited, by appropriate governance, information and 
management structures, there was a considerable surplus to be shared between the 
vendors (whose knowledge of such affairs was, by definition, limited) and promoters 
(who knew what the market would bear). This led to some quite extraordinary returns, 
both in Europe and in America, to some intermediaries with dubious skills, and some 
who were downright crooked, especially if they manipulated information asymmetries 
to mislead investors or vendors. Stories of promoters buying from vendors at a low price 
and selling to investors at substantially higher prices were then routine. Although both 
competition and publicity soon limited the potential gain, some of Morgan’s profits from 
this business were possibly of such windfall kinds.41 Morgan’s distinctive deals were, 
however, in merging already quoted enterprises and it seems to have been in large deals 
of this kind that he began to match railroad profits. The 1898 Federal Steel merger of 
five companies had netted the Morgan syndicate nearly $2.3 million, 16% of the $14 
million new capital raised, though the firm also arranged the exchange of existing paper 
in the merger for this fee.42 
          Morgan’s largest ever deal was the 1901 US Steel merger, which took fees 
beyond this level. On the face of it, this transaction was a very large-scale, but 
straightforward exchange of shares (no new capital was raised by public subscription), 
together with a large printing job for $303 million par value bonds, issued to Andrew 
Carnegie and his five partners for the previously unquoted component in the merger 
(the five partners also took part payment in US Steel stock of $189 million par value).43 
                                                  
40 Cowles, Common-Stock Indexes, p. 44; Van Oss, “The “Limited Company” Craze,” p. 733; 
Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths,” p. 14..   
41 O’Hagan,  Leaves, for the effects of competition on eroding early windfalls. 
42 Bureau, Steel Industry, pp. 125-6; treating US Steel as one large merger extending over 
the years 1897-1901 and counting all IPO/merger fees in that period as a proportion of the 
ultimate firm’s total first year market value, produces the more moderate profit, net of costs, 
for all involved issuers, of 7.7%, see ibid., p. 251. 
43  The 5% bonds were worth $349 million, on the basis of infrequent trades averaging 115 in   13
The main risk arose from the possible unwillingness of existing equity investors in some 
or all of the other merging firms to accept that Carnegie’s bonds should have a massive 
prior charge. Such high levels of leverage were unusual except for stable railroad stocks, 
so stockholder acquiescence could not be taken for granted.44  Morgan risked not only $3 
million expenses, but also the underwriting of the equity share of the commitment to 
the Carnegie partners, if obligated to go ahead with that separately. However, the 
stockholders in Federal Steel and the other merging companies would rationally only 
exchange their shares if they felt that the increased profits (from future monopoly or 
cost savings) compensated for the increased risk of the new prior charge and for the 
dilution of their existing (perfectly good and already expensively intermediated) equity 
by the new stock issued to pay the Morgan syndicate’s fee. Since both of these effects 
were very large, this was quite a tall order and signalling accurate information about 
them was probably the last thing in the minds of the Morgan partners. The problem 
that investors might baulk at this double dilution was simply resolved by offering the 
directors of the merging firms an insider deal (via participation in the underwriting 
syndicate) to induce them to recommend acceptance of the US Steel paper. Their 
stockholders, in the opaque offer document sent to them early in March 1901, were not 
informed of the level of fees, nor that their directors were beneficiaries.45 As Morgan 
later acknowledged, he understood why in London such non-disclosure was criminal. He 
also knew that in New York it was perfectly legal.46 
                                                                                                                                                  
the first year, as the Carnegie partners trickled their bonds to the market. (Ibid, pp. 174, 
242). 
44 In 1899, the top 100 US industrials had, at par, only 8% bonds, 23% preferred and 69% 
common (Bunting, Rise, p. 118); the previously quoted merging steel companies also had 
only 8% bonds, while US Steel at par had 27% bonds, 36% preferred and 36% common 
(Bureau,  The Steel Industry, 1, pp. 170, 242). At average first year market prices, the 
leverage was even higher: 34% bonds, 42% preferred and only 20% common. It was not 
unusual in London for one third of the capital of an industrial to be in bonds, one third in 
preference and one third in ordinary. 
45Bureau,  Steel Industry, pp. 243-49; Carosso, Morgans, pp. 466-74; Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, 72, 9 March 1901, pp. ix-x. The syndicate’s stock entitlement – but not 
the insider participation – was disclosed in the accounts for 1902. 
46 Pujo, Hearings, p. 1088. He stated it would be desirable to outlaw this behavior in New 
York, but difficult because of competition between stock exchanges, ignoring the point that 
in Britain (as in America later) it was legislation, not a stock exchange rule, that achieved   14
             Morgan proposed this integrated multi-firm merger with strong market 
power partly for well-known industrial reasons: Carnegie was threatening to integrate 
forward to downstream steel fabrication, which would threaten the profits of Morgan’s 
fabricating companies. The financing imperatives of the deal have been less noted. 
Carnegie wanted to retire, to which the obvious solution was an IPO for an independent 
Carnegie Steel. An offering for the world’s largest and most efficient steel company 
might attract the investing public, but it would also, at $480 million, have been the 
world’s biggest-ever IPO, and by a large margin. It was far from clear that the New York 
market had this capacity: the amount of cash raised in 1900-1904 from the general 
public totalled only $40 million a year from all common stock issues and $29 million 
from preferred; bonds - mainly for the railroads - raised another $521 million 
annually.47  London could have taken some of the strain, but in 1900-1904 even London 
was able to direct to all private overseas borrowers only $230 million annually of its 
$771 million new issues.48  It becomes evident that an IPO was probably not the answer. 
The decisive brilliance of the Morgan plan was that it was all-paper and avoided an 
immediate and large call for cash subscriptions. It required the underwriting syndicate 
only to provide a (more manageable) $25 million of new cash for operations, though they 
were potentially liable for a further $175 million, in the event that both preferred and 
common stock prices fell to zero, so the paper element in the Carnegie offer price could 
not be met. The “world’s first billion dollar manufacturer” simply merged existing paper, 
with some questionable adjustment of rights, into one federation.49 It was not so much 
an IPO, more a highly creative way of sidestepping an IPO that might have failed. 
                      There is something faintly comic in this situation. When Andrew Carnegie - 
who owned 55% of Carnegie Steel – assented to the deal, Morgan, probably correctly, 
congratulated him on having become the richest man in the world. It is difficult to think 
of anyone who could more appropriately shoulder equity risk, even in a retirement and 
philanthropy portfolio. Yet he had no faith in Wall Street, in Morgan, or in the new 
company: he knew that Federal Steel, the main Morgan component and a virtually 
                                                                                                                                                  
this.  
47 Goldsmith, Study, pp. 489, 503, 505. The much higher figures routinely quoted do not 
allow for issues below par, exchanges, stock retained by vendors etc. 
48  Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 41. 
49 Its securities were worth $1,133 million (Bureau, The Steel Industry, p. 242), but it was 
not the world’s first billion dollar corporation. The Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée Railway had 
already exceeded that in the nineteenth century.   15
identical business to Carnegie Steel in all except size, had been so managed that its rate 
of return was well below that of his own steel partnership.50 He therefore insisted on 
payment in 5% gold bonds. This was not a matter on which Morgan could rely on 
European precedent: European business owners usually wanted to retain some of the 
equity action when going public; and efficient firms acquired inefficient ones, rather 
than vice-versa. Moreover, no European manufacturer was even one-third the value of 
Carnegie Steel and the only American industrial that was bigger - Standard Oil – was 
not listed on the NYSE until 1920.51  This was a unique challenge.   
          US Steel would, therefore, naturally find it difficult to benchmark fees, but 
discussion of the matter was no doubt simplified by Morgan partner George Perkins, 
who chaired its finance committee. Such conflicts of interest may be against elementary 
rules of corporate governance (and the Bureau of Corporations and the Pujo Committee 
were suitably shocked), but in 1901 the rule book was still being written by Morgan. 
Effectively the only restraint on his profits in this exceptional transaction - in which he 
was, effectively, both client and banker - was his sense of moral responsibility and the 
threat of competition. Moral compasses are often erratic when such large sums are 
involved, but we can analyse potential competition. It certainly existed: in 1899 
Carnegie had conditionally sold Carnegie Steel to the Moore brothers of Chicago for a 
third of what he later got from Morgan, but they had failed to deliver, forfeiting the $1 
million penalty specified in the contract. There were other large investment banks 
undertaking significant corporate business, but this failure would have given all pause 
for thought. Morgan was already the most respected investment banker, and he would 
have to share underwriting commissions quite broadly. He had successfully launched 
Federal Steel, reconstructed leading railroads and, acting as a surrogate central banker 
in a country that lacked one, rescued New York from the 1895 panic. It was now 
payback time: his reputation was at its height and he had a bold, new idea. In Europe, 
                                                  
50 Warren  Big Steel, p. 16. 
51 Its stock was still owned by the Rockefellers and other founding families, who trickled it 
out slowly to the public on the curb over many years. A major difference between London 
and New York was that in New York stock was gradually released by families in this way 
(and also vendors by syndicate members after IPOs), rather than in a simultaneous, 
transparent public subscription, as in London. London’s listing rules, requiring that at least 
two-thirds of an issue be sold to the public, partly explain why London more closely 
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liquidity for developing large public issues was provided by giant, multi-branch 
commercial banks with substantial capital and large retail deposits, but America’s 
banking laws kept all but a few banks small.  Morgan’s networking with these few 
banks and rich individuals gave him access to the short-term funding that could be 
required on a scale that probably no one else in New York could match.52 In effect, 
because of a mixture of retarded equity market development, small commercial banks 
and an uncharacteristic burst of (dubiously ethical) originality, Morgan was a 
monopolist for this transaction. 
              T h e   t o t a l   f e e   f o r   M o r g an & Co and the underwriting syndicate was fixed 
at $130 million stock at par, half in common, half in preferred. Out of this, $3 million 
actual cash expenses, and the $25 million cash paid by the syndicate to the corporation, 
need to be deducted to determine the gross profit of the syndicate. The fee was paid in 
paper (there was nothing else in which to pay it), so Morgan also had to unload the stock 
onto the market on behalf of syndicate members. In the first year the stock traded at 
31% below par, so the syndicate realised $62.5 million net cash.53 This was a complex 
and creative transaction and surely justified more than the few million dollar fees for a 
large railroad reconstruction, but twenty or thirty times more? This transaction would 
simply not have been possible in Britain – not only was it illegal but merger for 
monopoly was less attractive in a tariff-free country – but at competitive fee rates it 
would notionally have cost $6 million, only one-tenth as much.54 In essence, the 
transaction had three elements. Allocating the actual profit of $62.5 million arbitrarily 
among these in the ratio 1:2:3 suggests net profit rates of 42% on the $25 million new 
cash the underwriters subscribed, 16% on the further $175 million underwritten and 
6% on the $1,133 million value of paper shuffled. To present any part of this transaction 
as a payment for “information signalling” would require someone with the imagination 
of Mark Twain (and he was on the other side). I do not know of any other significant 
transaction in the twentieth century where such high fee rates have been charged.55 
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This was an exceptional transaction and these were exceptional fees.   
           The rose-coloured view that “the enterprise was not in the business of 
enriching its insider financiers at the expense of its broader community of shareholders” 
is not easy to sustain at its birth, but Morgan’s men had done a workmanlike job 
establishing the new firm.56 Steel was a growth industry (capacity was doubled in ten 
years) and Judge Gary, the president, if unable to match Carnegie as a steelman, 
excelled at running a large bureaucratic federation with capable managers (building the 
image of a “good trust” by cultivating price stability, profit sharing and exemplary 
accounting transparency). The company had curtailed the immediately threatened 
competitive investments being planned by the merging partners and had more than half 
the market in many steel products. It was also able to buy some troublesome 
competitors and controlled America’s best ore reserves, while massive protective tariffs 
locked out foreign competition, so it is difficult to believe market power did not play a 
part in its rising profits, particularly as economies of scale in steelmaking at a size 
larger than Carnegie Steel were unlikely. Wherever the profits came from, they fully 
covered interest and dividend payments on bonds and preferred and still left something 
for the common.57 This was, then, a merger which did not turn out too badly for 
investors, and turned out immensely well for the insider managers and bankers in the 
syndicate.  
               G i v e n  t h a t  T o b i n ’ s  q  approached 2 for US Steel, the puzzling question 
(to which American economic history has not given a satisfactory answer) is why more 
new plants were not built to force steel prices down nearer to long-run marginal cost. 
Maybe the rapidly growing American economy had so many financial needs, for capital 
widening and deepening, and so little financial capacity, that disequilibrium conditions 
could persist for a long time. There was a fringe of competitors but their costs were high. 
The question really boils down to why only US Steel (rather than a fringe firm or a new 
entrant) built a new, state-of-the-art $70 million multi-plant lakeshore complex, like 
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that at Gary, Indiana.58 The answer may lie in vertical restraints (ore ownership or 
predatory pricing threats), or in the discouragement of competitive investment by the 
price “umbrella” that enabled inefficient rivals to make satisfactory profits even in 
downturns, or it may be that US capital markets still had only one man who could 
undertake risky financings on that scale: if so, Morgan was a formidable barrier to 
entry. 
         Whatever the correct answer to this question for the early twentieth century, 
it soon changed and US Steel accordingly began its long and inexorable relative decline. 
The world’s largest manufacturer was hardly a trendsetting precedent for the future of 
US finance and market structure and Redlich’s judicious summary of Morgan’s last 
decade or so - “profitable rather than economically desirable” - still carries some 
weight.59 Far more typical of America’s oligopoly future was the electrical industry, 
with three strong competitors (General Electric, Westinghouse and Western Electric), 
but - although Morgan had all three as clients - their issue business was sparser and 
less profitable. The highly leveraged steel merger (at average first-year market prices, 
there was four times as much capital in bonds and fixed interest preferred as in common 
stock) was also more like old-style railroad finance or new monopoly utilities than the 
lower levels of leverage which had been, and later again became, the corporate norm in 
competitive industries. Morgan’s vision of a capitalism of controlled competition of 
railroad-like, quasi-monopoly industrials receded, though he did win the business of 
that archetype of the centrally planned utility, AT&T, from Kidder Peabody in Boston, 
when the telephone company’s needs expanded sufficiently to require access to the 
NYSE.60 By 1910, a new generation of more competitive and diverse American banks 
was taking over from the Pierpont generation, exploiting new ideas and opportunities, 
soon lauding equities over bonds and democratising the limited and unusually 
plutocratic stockholding population that Morgan knew.61 The New York capital market 
of the 1920s was wider, deeper and more competitive. Even Morgan’s insider dealing 
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and conflicted roles became disapproved, and, eventually, illegal. 
             
         
                                          I V  
 
           A test of whether protection and quasi-monopoly in product markets, and 
market power and conflicted roles in a developing financial market, jointly explain some 
of Morgan’s high profits in American deals is to compare the outcome of his similar 
activities in Britain, a tariff-free economy with a larger and more competitive financial 
market, that also required more disclosure. Rumours of Morgan merger initiatives 
multiplied on the other side of the water in the early twentieth century, as Europeans 
looked with incredulity at the merger into the steel behemoth of the giant Carnegie 
Steel, itself already six times larger than any European steelmaker.62  Yet if Morgan felt 
that European steelmakers were too small, he apparently refrained from doing 
anything about it. The steelworks of Britain, Belgium, France and Germany continued 
to operate profitably at much smaller scale. The Morgan partners in London (and the, 
rather smaller, Morgan Harjes partnership in Paris) could do little business of the kind 
that preoccupied their American colleagues. In 1901, Morgans were clearly making a 
major effort, but seem to be merely scrabbling for low quality business. They floated ₤1 
million of United Collieries debentures, at 10% commission, but they soon had to lend 
this poorly managed Scottish coal company the interest payments to prevent default, 
while its two Morgan directors sorted out problems.63 They were able to charge 6% for 
brokerage and underwriting of the National Telephone Company’s 1901 ₤1 million 
offering of preference shares, but this company was no British AT&T. British investors knew its 
franchise was insecure (it was competing with the Post Office, which eventually took it over) and 
only 15% of the shares were subscribed, leaving Morgans barely covering costs on the deal. The 
London house also spearheaded a takeover of a London underground railway (built 
forty years before New York’s and badly needing modernisation), but were beaten to it 
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range. These three specialist firms in the European military-industrial complex apart, all 
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by Speyer Brothers, an American investment bank also operating in London.64  
          H o w e v e r ,  M o r g a n  w a s  a l r e a d y contemplating a European deal to replicate 
his American coup of the previous year: his blockbuster was announced to an astonished 
public in 1902. International Mercantile Marine (IMM) was essentially a merger of 
British shipping lines: its US-flagged ships accounted for only 15% of its assets. This 
was the USA’s largest, one-off, private, foreign direct investment before 191465 The 
north Atlantic freight and passenger trade was the largest world market for shipping 
and, by the turn of the century, several American, German and British interests were 
planning to consolidate it. One such was John Ellerman, an analytical, 36-year old 
accountant and venture capitalist, involved at the time in breweries, shipping and 
meatpacking. As chairman of Britain’s Leyland Line, having failed to buy his smaller 
British rival, Cunard, he bid for Atlantic Transport, a Baltimore-based shipowner. 
Clarence Griscom was then president of the Philadelphia-based International 
Navigation Company, which owned the, loss-making, US-flagged “American Line” on 
the key New York-Southampton route but made profits on its European-flagged niche 
routes operating between Philadelphia, Antwerp and Liverpool. He had obtained some 
congressional favours in the 1890s and interested Morgan in his plans to expand further 
as an American champion on the north Atlantic. Ellerman could hardly believe the 
reckless prices - 50% above replacement cost – that Morgan was willing to pay for 
shipping assets, so he changed tack and agreed to sell Leyland. Morgan suggested an 
insider deal for recommending the offer to shareholders (this was probably legal but 
considered unethical by some). Ellerman insisted on full disclosure and the insider price 
for all shareholders, and all in cash not paper. Morgan paid up, buying the line for $11 
million on his personal account, and was sufficiently impressed by his young adversary 
to ask him to stay on as part-time chairman, though Ellerman remained only for a year.     
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         Wider talks – involving both European and American partners – then took 
place, with the world’s largest shipbuilder (Harland & Wolff of Belfast), the upmarket 
British line (White Star), smaller British fleets, and the leading, continental owners: 
Hamburg-based HAPAG, Bremen-based NDL and the Holland-Amerika line (the 
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique was excluded because it was known that its French 
government contract barred foreign ownership). Eventually it was agreed that some 
competition would be neutralised by a ten-year, profit-sharing cartel agreement with 
the two German lines, while the new company would have a priority-guaranteed, 
cost-plus ship supply contract with Harlands. The German and American cartel 
partners also jointly secured majority control of the Holland-Amerika line, using a 
nominee to overcome the bar on non-Dutch control. The new, American-registered, IMM 
was the vehicle for the full 1902-03 merger of the core Anglo-American shipping 
partners. It would be the largest marine company in the world, with an unprecedented 
million tons capacity (equalling the entire French merchant marine, even without its 
cartel partners), operating a scheduled service on 32 transatlantic routes with 127 ships, 
including most of the world’s fastest and largest liners built for the premium 
transatlantic passenger trade. It was essentially a merger of three British-flagged lines 
- Leyland, Dominion and White Star - with the Baltimore and Philadelphia companies 
(one of which already owned the Belgian Red Star line). Most of the company’s ships 
would continue to fly the British flag: America was exceptional in normally banning the 
use of its flag on foreign-built ships and Morgan partner Sir Clinton Dawkins had 
smoothed ruffled British feathers by negotiating an agreement that these assets would 
be available to the British government in time of war. However, the balance of 
ownership and control had decisively shifted and – only a year after Morgan bought 
Leyland – the British-owned liner companies on the north Atlantic were relegated from 
first to third rank, behind the USA and Germany.   
             S u b s t a n t i a l  c a s h  p a y m e n t s  were required both for the existing British 
assets and for new ships ordered from Belfast, swallowing almost all the cash proceeds 
of the $50 million bond issue, underwritten by a Morgan syndicate. Perhaps half the 
preferred stock went initially to the British interests, but more than half of the $50 
million common and some preferred were the Morgan syndicate’s fee. This was, at par 
and proportionately to capital, of the same ample proportions as the US Steel fee. 
Morgan avoided the problem of the competitive London banking market in setting fees, 
as in the USA, by setting them himself. This was perfectly legal in Britain, but, as the 
offer document was to go to a British company’s shareholders, only if the fee were 
disclosed. It was, in May 1902. To the British press this appeared excessive dilution and,   22
since the deal would put the New Jersey company’s paper beyond British shareholder 
protections, the Economist advised that shareholders should, like Ellerman the 
previous year, insist on full cash payment and bail out.66 However a third of the key 
White Star shares were owned by its British managers, whom Morgan persuaded to 
stay, genuinely inspiring them by his financial power and business vision. They carried 
the shareholder vote to accept only 25% in cash, taking the rest in IMM stock. It was 
recognised that there was a good deal of water in the capitalisation, but most of the 
upside lay in American hands. No one, for obvious reasons, mentioned New York capital 
being cheaper than London’s, but the aim was for increased market power, better fleet 
scheduling to improve load factors, management savings from applying American 
methods, and a growing, modernised fleet. The Wall Street Journal expected the new 
management would raise profits from $6.5 million to $11 million, enabling the company 
to pay the full preferred 6% dividend and 3% on the common. Though smaller than US 
Steel, IMM would, if that performance were met, be worth a substantial proportion of 
the $160 million par value of its securities, thus exceeding the value of any 
contemporary European industrial or commercial company.67 
          For all except those who took the Morgan dollar and ran, the outcome was a 
disaster. It is no accident that John Ellerman - the British financier who initiated the 
merger process, then yielded to Morgan’s superior firepower, while insisting on payment 
in cash - is the only contemporary Briton known to have died richer than Pierpont 
Morgan, who lost at least a million dollars on this deal, while others lost a good deal 
more.68 Morgan & Co and their underwriting syndicate members could only unload 
IMM securities on the public at a heavy discount (by January 1904 the common traded 
on the New York curb at 95% below par and the preferred at 80% below par). No 
dividends were paid on any stock, except to the continuing minority holders of Leyland 
preference shares (Ellerman, puzzled at how Morgan could pay a dividend, had put his 
lawyer on the board and left a ring-fenced structure to protect them). IMM’s 4½% bonds 
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also fell below par and by 1906 Morgan had still only been able to dispose of barely a 
quarter of them, forcing the underwriters to shoulder the rest. Morgan saved face by 
paying the bond interest in some years when IMM itself could not, but the shipping 
giant finally defaulted on its bond interest payments in 1914. The cartel arrangement 
with the German lines was ineffective in raising prices and was not renewed when it 
expired in 1912, while the expanding German merchant marine edged America’s down 
to third rank, globally, in the years before the war. 
         Ellerman thought that Morgan had overpaid for the assets, but, by the same 
metric of price paid to book value, he had also overpaid – and by a wider margin - for US 
Steel. IMM, however, could not generate the monopoly profits or management savings 
required to recover from the over-valuation and its failings were even greater than the 
dismal financial results indicated.  The White Star line had previously ploughed back 
85% of its profits into the development of the business (a figure also approached by its 
rivals, Cunard and HAPAG), but Morgan’s generous capitalisation had been based on 
the idea of reducing this to 30% by increasing the investor payout. The expected 
“savings from American management” did not materialise and profits often fell below 
those earned by its predecessors, and this doubly reduced investment flow was absorbed 
by losses in the inefficient partner lines. While British and German companies made 
5-6% annual depreciation allowances, IMM allowed less than 3½%: clearly too little for 
a line aspiring to upmarket liner service, especially one whose ships proved 
accident-prone (IMM’s underinsured Titanic sank on its maiden voyage in 1912, but 
that was only the most infamous of several losses; while its rival, Cunard, with many 
more decades of risks at sea, had never lost a passenger). 
         IMM - a takeover of a formerly well-run core firm by apparently weaker 
managers, organised as a holding company, with high leverage and “world-beating” 
scale – shared all these key characteristics with US Steel. The efficient scale in both 
industries was similar. The Gary, Indiana multi-plant complex that US Steel built to 
meet expanding demand may be taken as that company’s own estimate (at $70 million) 
of optimal scale and scope: it was vertically integrated and its many fabricating plants, 
managed by separate federated subsidiaries, produced a wide range of steel products. In 
the case of shipping, $70 million would buy 14 of the largest state-of-the-art liners at $5 
million each, or more likely a mix with smaller ones (not all routes had the heavy traffic 
and premium passengers of New York-Southampton or New York-Liverpool). A shipping 
line that size could offer frequent scheduled liner service between a range of ports. 
There may have been some agglomeration economies available to larger firms that a 
$70 million investment could not capture (for example, shared marketing), but they are   24
not obviously substantial. IMM was less vertically integrated than US Steel, but it 
seems unlikely that owning Harland’s would have produced cheaper ships than its 
long-term supply contract. Harlands was one of half a dozen shipyards worldwide 
(others were on the Tyne, Clyde and Baltic) that could assemble the very largest 
state-of-the-art ships, so there was no realistic prospect of using vertical restraints to 
deter entry, on the lines US Steel found easier within the USA. 
             The fact that the White Star and Leyland lines (before IMM took them 
over) and their British rivals on the Atlantic like Furness and Cunard (thereafter) were 
well managed and financially successful suggests Boyce is right about the effectiveness 
of British approaches to finance and information asymmetries in this industry.69 Within 
ten years, Cunard had regained the Blue Riband liner speed record: important to first 
class passengers and the result of pioneering turbine propulsion. Britain again had the 
largest national share of north Atlantic tonnage, with a good part of the premium 
passenger market and clear dominance in freight. British tramps could easily move in 
and out of the north Atlantic trade from other markets, responding flexibly to changing 
profitability. For the Irish shipbuilder partner, Harland & Wolff, IMM’s cost-plus orders 
(modernising the fleet but increasing its size by only 10%) preserved high profits, 
though it fell from first to fifth rank among world shipbuilders, as IMM’s British and 
German rivals directed much of their, more rapidly expanding, business elsewhere. 
Ellerman, though barred by agreement from the North Atlantic for fourteen years, 
spent his cash pile from Morgan on building a new shipping line, soon one of the largest 
in the world and paying investors initial 6% dividends, rising to 7%. Of course, that did 
not mean that other British managers and financiers were incapable of matching 
Morgan’s delusions of boardroom competence and financial omnipotence: Sir Owen 
Phillips did later create the Royal Mail Group - as large and dysfunctional as IMM - but 
that, too, eventually disintegrated. All dysfunctional firms in this industry disappeared; 
it simply took large ones a little longer. 
          T h a t  p o i n t s  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  of competition they faced as the key difference 
between the IMM and US Steel cases. Playing on a more open and diverse stage than he 
was used to at home, Morgan found the business skills required to achieve a competitive 
edge internationally were very different from those required to preside over a protected 
national monopoly. Griscom was no Gary, but it is a moot point whether Gary would 
have been as successful in a more competitive industry. Estimates of IMM’s initial 
market share vary markedly depending on how the market is defined and whether the 
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cartel partners are included, but this merely betrays the weakness of its competitive 
position. Critically, IMM also lacked the tariff protection (inherently impossible on the 
high seas) that most American firms took for granted; and there were limits to the 
shipping subsidies that even Senator Mark Hanna could extract from Congress. The 
American bluster of the affair did, however, panic the normally laissez-faire British 
government into (quite unnecessary) retaliatory subsidies for one of the British 
competitors, Cunard. If – as rivals feared - Morgan attempted to engineer 
discriminatory through-rates for passengers or freight for IMM on his railroads, it 
appears to have had little effect (the German state, by contrast, was far more effective 
at doing this). The president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, A. J. Cassatt (who pointedly 
resigned from Griscom’s board  b e f o r e  h e  m e r g e d  i n t o  IMM), explicitly re-assured 
European ship-owners he would refuse to discriminate: he was anxious to expand his 
Atlantic port business, not restrict it. US Steel did supply Harlands with steel at 
three-quarters of the price they charged American shipbuilders and, since its ship 
contracts were cost-plus, the cost-saving fed right back to IMM, but this was 
insignificant, since British and Belgian steel was anyhow available to rivals at below 
the American monopoly’s price. Nor could Morgan create a stronger shipping monopoly: 
offers were made to Cunard, but at too low a price to compensate for the likely future 
profitability of beating an unprotected high-cost competitor. British capital markets 
played a key part in facilitating new entry that New York apparently did not play, until 
after 1910, in US Steel’s case. Investors and rich individuals were already by 1902 
enthusiastically financing British lines’ ship purchases, at two-thirds of the price they 
knew Morgan had paid for his ships. In capital-rich pre-1914 Britain – as in the 
capital-rich 1920s USA - Tobin’s q often elicited the predicted response. There was 
sufficient finance quickly to penalise Morgan’s error of judgment: disequilibrium was 
short-lived.  
             The key problem for Morgan was the UK’s commitment to free and open 
markets, a doctrine known to contemporaries as “the Manchester School” or 
Manchesterismus, but now more commonly referred to as “the Washington consensus.” 
In the Washington of 1900 - as in 23 Wall Street - that viewpoint was considered 
extremist and crackpot, but, in London, it “was a doctrine still held with quasi-religious 
fervour by the majority of her office-holders, businessmen and general public. To them 
its benefits appeared self-evident.”70 Accordingly, British Empire ports were open to 
all-comers (for UK domestic and imperial cabotage as well as for foreign trade) and 
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there were few protectionist tariffs in Britain or its colonies. The imperial government, 
it is true, was unable to induce self-governing dominions like Canada to accept free 
trade policies: their views on such matters were American. Occasionally there were also 
other lapses from openness, but, until the 1930s, these were trivial by comparison with 
the multiple tariff and non-tariff barriers erected by the United States – and, to a lesser 
extent, Germany and France - at home and in their expanding empires.   
           I n   m a r k e d   c o n t r a s t   t o   the globalisation that followed American-led, 
multilateral, tariff disarmament after World War Two, British policy was - as Economics 
101 says it should be – unilateral (and generally unreciprocated), so it had more 
profoundly concentrated effects on its only large practitioner. British business activities 
strikingly clustered by 1912/13 in areas that served, or especially benefited from, this 
openness, like the financial services we have described, but also shipping (40% of world 
tonnage), giant corporations (headquartering 28 of the global top 100 quoted firms) and 
manufactured exports (32% of the world total). London – a city twice the size of New 
York - was at the node of a larger economic space than the country of which it was the 
capital; and in areas like these it naturally punched well above the UK’s economic 
weight. At that time that archipelago off the northwest coast of Europe accounted for 
only 16% of world manufacturing production and 8% of world GDP.71 
           Y e t ,  i t  i s  e a s y  t o  s e e  w h y  –  the personal and cultural draws that he felt to 
Europe apart – the richest financier in the world’s largest economy might also want to 
cut a figure in another larger, international and affluent marketplace. However, any 
innovative banking routines developed in New York faced tougher market tests there. 
Morgan could follow US Steel precedent and apparently (at par) evade London’s 
tiresomely competitive IPO fees, by making himself both client and banker at IMM, but 
he could not as easily create a dominant monopoly, nor foist on a more informed 
investing public the lower-quality securities that resulted, so his fees proved (at market) 
worthless, indeed negative. In this more demanding economic space, even a man used to 
throwing his financial weight around could more easily be cut down to size. That 
Morgan, despite trying hard, could not do much premium corporate finance business in 
Britain after the IMM fiasco – while Barings (with Cunard, Guinness and Vickers in 
their stable) and Rothschilds (with De Beers and Rio Tinto in theirs) disdainfully turned 
down all except the top industrial clients - is hardly a surprise. The Barings’ privately 
stated view of the London Morgan operation (“so entirely useless and so out of touch 
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with anything that is of value in English financial and commercial life”) was an 
informed assessment based on performance, not just the prejudice of a competitor.72 In 
London, the Morgan reputation still counted for an international bond, or for an 
American industrial with market power, but, in European corporate finance, it was 
tarnished. 
 
                                       V  
 
                Morgan met livelier competition in the London securities business 
from boutique finance houses, stockbrokers, accountants, lawyers, banks, sector 
specialists and company promoters (or “issuing houses” as the more respectable were 
being called). Some of these were bigger players: their London market share was not 
smaller than Morgan’s in New York because of their size, but because they operated in a 
larger market. In 1900, the Rothschild banks - in London, Vienna and Paris - together 
had $180 million capital. The self-made, German-born, British-naturalised partners in 
Wernher Beit, the specialist London mining finance house, were also personally (jointly) 
worth more than Morgan and they controlled investments worth $359 million.73 
Although there was considerable specialization of London’s financial institutions, those 
serving overseas clients, like Morgans themselves, extensively overlapped with those 
serving domestic companies. In a largely passport-less world, in which English 
corporate law, accountancy and language, as well as the pound sterling, all had 
international currency, London saw little difference between a “foreign” Buenos Ayres 
tramway and a “home” Dublin stout brewery: Barings had launched IPOs for both of 
them in 1886. Wernher Beit was the leading overseas mining finance house, but it was 
also involved, with the Rothschilds, in financing London’s central underground electric 
line.74 London’s standard reference manual, the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, 
urbanely classified companies by business sector, not nationality (the classification that 
has obsessed most historians).75  In this cosmopolitan city, overseas and domestic issues 
were thought of as one business: the same polyglot, globally-minded lawyers, 
stockbrokers, bankers and accountants serviced both. Merchant banks did not, however, 
                                                  
72  Baring family letter of 1905, quoted in Ziegler, Sixth Great Power, p. 298. 
73 Ferguson,  World’s Banker, p. 1039; Chapman, Merchant Enterprise, p. 278. 
74 Barker  and  Robbins.  History, pp. 25, 39-42. 
75  The exception being railways, a section of the directory so large that it was divided among 
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have things all their own way domestically, as in large overseas government issues. In 
so far as anyone dominated the local corporate new issues business, it was a neighbour 
of Morgan’s in Old Broad Street, Henry Osborne O’Hagan’s City of London Contract 
Corporation (CLCC). O’Hagan sometimes collaborated on new issues with Phillips & 
Drew, the stockbrokers, and with John Ellerman, achieving a market share of perhaps 
10% of home issues in the 1890s. CLCC offered a modestly priced, honest service and its 
solid reputation with the commercial banks meant that, even with its own, small ($1.6 
million) assets, it could readily buy out industry vendors and carry their larger assets 
prior to public issue, when required. However, its massive (but under-subscribed) issue 
of Associated Portland Cement shares in 1900 overstretched the firm and obliged it to 
cut back operations in the following decade, with O’Hagan working part-time on 
managing the largest cement company in the world that he had created.76  
                        Such “first class firms whose reputations and profits are dependent on fair 
dealing” naturally tried to gain a reputation as quality certifiers of new issues, taking 
some responsibility in this way when things went unexpectedly wrong.77 Competition 
did, however, mean that their quality certificate really had to mean something to 
command premium fees and charges were more closely related to costs than in New 
York, where Morgan and a few other banks dominated the market. Hence, issue costs 
were generally lower in London, particularly for the larger issues. The trend-setting 
1886 Guinness IPO for £5.2 million ($25 million), it is true, mildly embarrassed Barings 
by yielding what in Britain were thought excessive returns of 10% of the amount raised 
(their fees were lower: this also includes their post-issue capital gains on the 15% of the 
capital Barings subscribed themselves)78 Fees as high as 12% charged in the 1890s by 
the unscrupulous promoter, Ernest Terah Hooley (who went bankrupt in 1898), appear 
as textbook indicators of the high prices British clients (who included Dunlop, Bovril 
and Schweppes) had to pay for poorer issuing services than Morgan offered in the USA, 
though Morgan’s own US fees (often higher) revealingly go unmentioned in such 
“comparisons”.79 Yet, by then, many respectable British promoters and bankers less 
flamboyantly offered more reasonable fees. Even for small IPOs equivalent to around 
                                                  
76 O’Hagan, Leaves;  Taylor, Ellermans, pp.11-15; CLCC, Annual Reports 1895-1910 (in 
Guildhall Library, London). Its declared profits fell from ₤20,000 a year before 1900 to around 
₤8,000 afterwards. 
77 Lavington,  English capital market, p. 192. 
78 Ziegler, Sixth great power, pp. 199-200. 
79  Boyce and Ville, Development, p. 107.   29
two million dollars – smaller than the New York partners would normally look at – the 
British merchant bank, Hambros, charged fe e s  s i mi l a r  t o  C L C C ’ s :  on l y  1 - 2 %  of  t h e 
money raised, with 3% optional extra for underwriting. Barings charged similarly 
modest fees for bond issues for established public utility clients.80 
           I n v e s t o r s  a n d  c o m p a n i e s  a like seemed happy with the competitive London 
market and it is hard to see a serious objection to the operations of men like O’Hagan 
and Ellerman, with a deserved reputation for looking after their investors and the 
ability to build some cheaply financed, competitive, manufacturing and service 
businesses, or to wish on their investors some of the Morgan practices from which, we 
have seen, they were protected. However, J Bradford De Long has made the claim that 
Morgan’s high fees in New York were justified by the innovative “information 
signalling” that he provided to US investors, while London was blighted by its more 
competitive banking structure.81 London, he argues, would actually have been better 
off with fewer banks, which would then have had a stronger incentive to certify quality, 
which in turn would have strengthened their market power, as they ascended in a 
virtuous spiral to Morgan-like excellence. The point is that, with many banks, each with 
a small market share, “the future returns expected from a reputation as an honest 
broker might … be small, and less than the present benefits of exploiting to the fullest 
one unsound deal.”82 
              D e  L o n g ’ s  a r g u m e n t  i s  b o lstered by a battery of quantitative tests of US 
investment performance, though London’s allegedly inferior performance is not 
subjected to similar tests: London finance is, curiously, held to have failed by 
assumption. His first performance indicator for US investments is the ratio of the 
market value of a (non-random) sample of Morgan securities to the book value of their 
assets, compared to a control group of non-Morgan firms.83  He strikingly concludes that 
                                                  
80  Rutterford, “Merchant banker,” Ziegler, Sixth great power, p. 288; O’Hagan, Leaves. 
81 De Long, “Did J. P. Morgan’s men.” The article is one of the most frequently cited in 
economic history. This perhaps owes more to the intellectual appeal of its inventive 
ratiocination on the fashionable subject of information asymmetries than to the quality of its 
empirical underpinning, on which the author’s own claims at the time were appropriately 
modest. I have been unable to replicate his results from the sources cited (some of the 
problems are outlined in the following footnotes), or to obtain any explanation from the 
author. 
82  Ibid., p. 210. 
83 It was based on the twenty companies – three utilities, nine railroads and eight others –   30
Morgan directors added 30% to the value of firms on whose board they served. The 
non-standard nature of contemporary accounting rules on matters like depreciation of 
balance sheet assets and stock watering counsels caution in interpreting such a test in 
America, or, indeed, in any country, but, for what they are worth, similar tests can be 
deployed in Britain.84 For the market as a whole, ratios of market value to par or 
nominal values of issued capital were significantly higher in the UK than in the USA, 
implying, by analogy with De Long, higher overall “value added” by British directors in 
general. However, American interstate competition to the bottom in prospectus and 
securities regulation may explain this American deficiency: in other words this is 
probably a measure of the “value added” by British legislators, not by London directors 
or financiers.85 His narrower US test can also be replicated for London, substituting 
Rothschild, Baring and CLCC corporate clients for Morgan’s (who, as we have seen, 
struggled in the London market). By De Long’s chosen measure, there is an 
out-performance by these leading British issuers, parallel to Morgan’s in the USA.86 
                                                                                                                                                  
that the Pujo Committee allegedly identified as having Morgan directors in 1913, though the 
population studied is, in fact, a non-random sample of less than half the 43 such firms (Pujo, 
Report, pp. 57-65). De Long admits (p. 225) to only two of the omitted 23, for which he says 
“satisfactory data” were “unavailable.” There is data on one of these two - the Pere 
Marquette Railroad – and on many of the 21 unmentioned ones in the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle. Pere Marquette’s common stocks were near worthless and its 
predicament derived from a serious Morgan misjudgment, see Hungerford, Men, p. 220. The 
n i n e  o m i t t e d  b a n k s  w i t h  M o r g a n  d i r e c t o r s  had a slightly worse performance than the 
nearest size-matched pairs in the same cities (author’s calculation from data in Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle Bank and Quotation Section, 94, January 1912, pp. 60, 62). 
84 The Bureau of Corporations (Steel Industry, p. 16), in its careful forensic accounting 
assessment of the constituents of US Steel, noted that there was much less water in 
Morgan’s flagship Federal Steel promotion than in the four steel companies promoted by 
Moore. Such effects could account for De Long’s results without any director 
out-performance. De Long asserts there was a reverse bias, strengthening his result, but 
provides no similar accounting evidence. Compare also Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 99. 
85  Grandy, “New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering.” 
86 The Rothschild, Baring and CLCC clients were identified from their corporate histories 
and O’Hagan’s autobiography, and include companies whose issues were sponsored in 
1886-1900, not just those on whose boards partners sat in 1900. Ratios of market value to 
book assets were calculated for 2 January 1900 from stock prices in the Stock Exchange   31
The finding that issuer-underwriter reputation counted in both places is hardly 
surprising. It is not sensible to replicate De Long’s second test - of longer-run 
investment performance of Morgan firms relative to the NYSE index - because his 
specification is obscure and apparently defective.87 Moreover, some of the long-run 
investments he thus measures were not public offerings, but available only to insiders.88 
However, John Ellerman, did offer a service to London investors that was the logical 
way of marketing the long-run investment certifying skills that Morgan’s men are 
alleged to have demonstrated (though there is no indication that Morgan thought of 
this): that is, by managing investment trusts. Ellerman’s trusts – and they were by no 
means alone in the British market - performed better than the relevant benchmarks.89  
               M o d e r n   f i n a n c i a l   r e g u l a tors are, however, known to prohibit appeals to 
such evidence – typically compromised by ex post bias – without strong health warnings, 
and similar caveats apply just as strongly to De Long-style tests. Both the US and UK 
results are likely contaminated by survivor bias and should be taken with a very large 
pinch of salt. It is, for example, not implausible that bankers in both countries were 
more inclined to stay on the boards of successful than unsuccessful companies. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Daily Official Intelligence and from balance sheet data in the companies’ reports in the 
Guildhall Library collection. The control group was a random sample of 30 other 
London-listed firms. The top issuers “outperformed” the control group by 12%.To correct for 
leverage, I included all securities (including debentures and preference shares, as well as 
ordinaries) in the numerator, so these figures are more appropriately compared to Ramirez’s 
(“Did J. P. Morgan’s Men,” p. 669) corrected Morgan US out-performance figure of 14%, not 
to De Long’s original 30%. 
87 De Long evaluates an equal-weighted rate of return for an (even further truncated) 
sample of 15 Morgan stocks over various periods within the period 1895-1913, against a 
size-weighted NYSE index return for the longer 1890-1914 period (Cowles Commission, 
Common-Stock Indexes). The logic is obscure. It is clear that it would not be hard to produce 
similar results for the UK with a similarly arbitrary choice among chronologically 
non-coincident and incompatibly-weighted indexes, but the resultant “findings” would be as 
meaningless as De Long’s for the USA. 
88  A rate of return is, for example, calculated for International Harvester from 1902; yet the 
stock was not available to NYSE investors, as opposed to the owners’ relatives and Morgan 
insiders, until 1908. It is unclear how De Long calculated market returns for unquoted 
securities. 
89 Glasgow,  English investment trust companies, pp. 38-39, 76-77, 116-17.   32
Investors attempting to decide ex ante where to invest did not have De Long’s ex post 
knowledge. Contemporary New York and Philadelphia directories for 1899/1900 show 
Morgan partners then held 101 directorships, only a minority of which were the 
predecessor firms of the 15-21 firms De Long selected for analysis from a 1913 list of 
43.90  He rests his case for presuming survivor bias is not a problem on his standard 
argument: Morgan’s market share was so large that partners would not sully their 
reputation by cheating investors, whereas lesser mortals would be tempted by the fast 
buck. He instances (p. 210) the notorious Amalgamated Copper stock manipulation as 
the kind of investor “scam” that Morgan partners, following his logic, would avoid. He 
was evidently unaware of the extent to which the partners quite failed to understand 
their alleged strategy: the New York directory shows Morgan partner Robert Bacon was, 
in fact, on the board of Amalgamated Copper! That De Long’s flimsy evidence has been 
extensively and approvingly cited - as demonstrating a decisive American innovation in 
investment banking that London was unable to match - is symptomatic of the “Whig” 
bias in American historiography and the “declinist” bias in British. The kindest verdict 
on his hypothesis is “not proven”. It is noteworthy that, in Japan and Germany, where 
he suggests similar bank director effects are observed, others have also cast reasonable 
doubt on the hypothesis.91  
 
 
                                       V I  
 
              None of this, of course, denies that the New York Stock Exchange was 
rapidly expanding its domestic business, nor that J. P. Morgan & Co contributed to that 
catch-up process. However, in a relatively backward and unregulated market like New 
York, rather more elementary “informational” innovations were clearly the priority. In 
1900, when the president of the (then largest NYSE-traded) industrial, American Sugar, 
thundered to Congressmen that “You cannot wet-nurse people from the cradle to the 
grave,” he was not condemning socialized medicine, but the publication of corporate 
accounts, then considered by some American businessmen an outrageous foreign 
deviation.92 At that time, 43% of even the largest 100 US industrials did not so 
                                                  
90 Audit  Company,  Directory; Anon, Financiers. 
91  Miwa and Ramseyer, The fable; Fohlin, Finance capitalism. 
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much as publish balance sheets, much less income statements. 93 Firms like 
Standard Oil, Singer or Amalgamated Copper were, in the expressive Yankee 
financial jargon of the day, “blind pools:” their directors refused to publish accounts 
to mere stockholders. In the later 1890s, some quoted companies that did publish 
accounts, like Anaconda (when the Rockefellers acquired a controlling interest from 
the Rothschilds) and Procter & Gamble (worried publication was aiding 
competitors), ceased doing so. The NYSE committee from 1895 followed London and 
required listed companies to publish accounts, finally de-listing Procter & Gamble 
in 1903 for repeatedly failing to comply (it was not re-listed until 1929).94 However 
– unwilling to endanger its members’ commissions on more frequently traded stocks 
– the NYSE allowed many other firms not publishing accounts to continue 
“unlisted” trading, until that was abolished in 1910. Morgan apparently did not 
subscribe to the obscurantists’ views, but supported the NYSE committee: at least, 
all his firms appear to have published accounts95. This naturally strained local 
auditing capacity (New York had certificated only 303 public accountants by 1901), 
but the annual accounts of Morgan firms were a mainstay of the English firm, Price 
Waterhouse, which had access to the pool of thousands of British accountants well 
trained in the basics of merger accounting, valuations and corporate audit. PW had 
opened its New York office in 1890, initially to service O’Hagan’s US business, but it 
was soon also helping Morgan. The New York office had to cable London for 
reinforcements, increasing its staff from fifteen to seventy-three in 1901-1903 alone, 
to cope with merger investigations and subsequent regular audits of US Steel and 
others.96 
            The half dozen leading New York investment banks, with Morgans in the 
lead, also played a part in certifying the quality of new issues, as investors cautiously 
learned to value that signal above that of earlier promoters like Moore, Flint or Dos 
Passos. The Pujo committee complained that they thereby came to monopolise the New 
York issue market, though the strikingly distinctive feature of the USA’s financial 
                                                  
93 Bunting, Rise, pp. 155-56. For the much wider voluntary spread of outside professional 
auditing among British companies, even before the law was tightened in 1900 and 1907, 
compare Fisher, “President’s address.” 
94 Schisgall,  Eyes, p. 51. 
95 Judging both from the collection of American company accounts in the Guildhall Library 
and the briefer account summaries in Moody’s Manual of Corporate Securities. 
96 Jones,  True and fair, pp. 75-78, 90-97; DeMond, Price, Waterhouse, pp. 32-36, 58-66.     34
development is not the NYSE’s increasing success, but the continuing diversity and 
regional decentralisation away from New York of American finance. Morgan’s high fees 
and other monopolistic restrictions of the Wall Street oligarchy no doubt reinforced that 
tendency. There were in the USA many tens of thousands of family-owned incorporated 
enterprises, considerably more than in Britain. Most American corporations were 
traded, if at all, on the dozens of local stock exchanges, or simply “over-the-counter” on 
the basis of local knowledge by thousands of local dealers and banks, linked in some 
cases by ticker and telephone to New York, but often with purely local markets. 
Securities of almost all the large British companies in Payne’s list for 1905 were traded 
on the London Stock Exchange, but barely half the similarly-sized American industrials 
traded on the NYSE at the same date.97 Among Pittsburgh’s leading companies, US 
Steel became a mainstay of the NYSE, but the (closely-held) Alcoa, Gulf Oil and 
Koppers coke and chemical enterprises preferred local financing by the Mellon Bank, 
eschewing listing for decades, while Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Heinz remained family 
enterprises. Pittsburgh’s independent spirit may have limited the size of New York’s 
pool of liquid securities, but it may also have generated locally rich information flows 
and shared incentives which were no less supportive of business success. By contrast, 
London’s central liquidity and scale advantages and early enthusiastic espousal of the 
                                                  
97 Author’s calculations from the lists in Payne (“Emergence,” pp. 539-40 ) and Bunting 
(Rise, pp 163-4. ) and listing data in the (UK) Stock Exchange Daily Official List and (US) 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 12% of the British firms were provincially listed but 
they may also have been traded in the supplementary list or “over-the-counter” in London 
(whose brokers worked in symbiosis with provincial brokers). In the USA, by contrast, the 
NYSE, in pursuit of greater monopoly advantage from its unrivalled liquidity pool, generally 
banned joint listings and trading with regional exchanges (though permitting this with 
London). Many large American companies were unlisted or listed on other organised 
exchanges (including Philadelphia, Boston, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Baltimore and London) 
and/or the (still informal) New York curb rather than traded on the NYSE (including in the 
“unlisted department”). It is sometimes forgotten by those who cite the classic article by 
Navin and Sears (“The rise of a market for industrial securities, 1887-1902”) that it 
describes a market developing later (albeit faster) than European equivalents, that was still 
half empty. Of course, the regional exchanges had a higher share of smaller companies: as 
late as the 1930s, the NYSE share of the market value of all common and preferred stocks 
quoted on all American stock exchanges was only 34% (Committee on Banking And 
Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, pp. 8-9.)   35
divorce of ownership from control obviously helped some modern, large-scale business 
corporations grow, but may not have been unequivocally positive.98 Such an analysis 
sits uncomfortably within a teleology that requires everything in modern, successful 
America to be new, path-breaking, professional and of dominant scale, while archaic, 
failing Britain is hidebound, amateur, nepotistic and provincial. Yet, if we wish 
accurately to reflect corporate reality, we may sometimes have to dump the standard 
modernization myth that seriously distorts the two countries’ business historiographies, 
even if it serves as a useful heuristic in some other contexts. There was a rich variety of 
possible capitalist paths to twentieth century prosperity, not one standard, financially 
centralized and fully securitized road to modernity. 
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